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This paper compares the ex ante simulation of the 
impacts of conditional cash transfer programs against the 
ex post estimates of impacts obtained from experimental 
evaluations. Using data on program-eligible households 
in treatment areas from the same baseline surveys that 
are used for experimental evaluations of conditional cash 
transfer programs in Mexico and Ecuador, the authors 
use a micro-simulation model to derive ex ante estimates 
of the impact of the programs on enrollment rates and 
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poverty. The estimates reveal that ex ante predictions of 
certain impacts of conditional cash transfer programs 
match up well against the benchmark estimates of ex post 
experimental studies. The findings seem to support the 
use of this model to assess the potential impact and cost 
efficiency of a conditional cash transfer program ex ante, 
in order to inform decisions about how the program 
would be designed.   
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I. Introduction 
Conditional  Cash  Transfer  programs  (CCTs)  have  been  used  by  many  governments  in  their 
attempts to reduce poverty and inequality and achieve longer term human development. CCTs 
are typically intended to generate incentives among the poor to improve human capital so that 
they  can  break  free  of  poverty  traps  across  generations.  While  CCT  programs  in  different 
countries may vary in their design and purpose, they tend to share a few basic features. All of 
them involve transferring resources (usually in the form of cash) to poor households, which are 
usually provided directly to the mother with reciprocal conditions imposed on the household, to 
encourage  changes  in  behavioral  norms.  These  conditions  commonly  include  requiring,  for 
example, that children attend school and/or individuals have regular health facility visits.  
Different  methods  of  evaluation  have  been  developed  to  analyze  the  likely  impacts  of  a 
monetary  transfer  on  human  capital  accumulation  and  poverty  alleviation.  The  array  of 
literature on program evaluation presents two broad types of analysis, ex post and ex ante. Ex 
post  evaluations  can  in  turn  be  divided  into  two  categories:  experimental  and  quasi-
experimental.  Experimental  analyses  are  those  where  households  or  geographic  units  are 
randomly assigned to both treatment and control groups prior to the implementation of the 
program. Quasi-experimental evaluations are those where treatment and control groups are not 
selected through random assignment (of households or geographic units), with the result that 
statistical techniques are necessary to correct and control for observable and unobservable 
differences between the two groups that might affect outcomes of interest.  
Ex post evaluation methods have major advantages in terms of generating statistically valid 
results  about  the  impact  of  a  monetary  transfer  through  a  CCT  program,  against  a 
counterfactual  of  not  having  the  program.  However,  such  methods  can  also  have  a  few 
important  disadvantages,  depending  on  the  type  of  techniques  used.  Experimental  ex  post 
evaluations  may  provide  more  statistically  valid  and  robust  results  relative  to  quasi-
experimental methods, but they are often costly and time-consuming to implement, particularly 
on  a  large  scale.    Quasi-experimental  techniques,  while  typically  less  costly  and  easier  to 
implement  than  experimental  analyses,  have  the  disadvantage  of  requiring  a  high  level  of 
statistical  complexity  to  account  for  selection  bias  and  the  effects  of  unobservable 
characteristics.  3 
Regardless of the method used, an exclusive reliance on ex post evaluations is also likely to 
provide  little  evidence  prior  to  implementation  about  the  potential  impact  of  programs–  a 
question that policymakers are often  most interested in, while designing large programs or 
reforms. Often, the design and implementation of large income transfer programs cannot be 
delayed  till  a  series  of  pilots  “testing”  various  design  elements  have  been  completed  and 
evaluated using ex post techniques. In other cases, even when the pilot(s) have been tested and 
evaluated,  concerns  about  “external  validity”  imply  that  the  policymaker  cannot  be  sure 
whether a program implemented on a much larger scale than the pilot would have similar 
impacts  or  lack  thereof.  Moreover,  policymakers  are  often  interested  in  questions  like  the 
sensitivity  of  outcomes  to  amounts  of  transfers,  the  differences  between  the  impacts  of 
conditional  and  unconditional  transfers,  or  the  efficiency  and  effectiveness  of  alternative 
program designs. While testing alternative program designs is possible in theory using ex post 
methods, the complications that arise in implementing and evaluating the relative impacts of 
multiple “treatments” make such evaluations extremely difficult in practice.  
Ex ante evaluations involve simulating the effects of a program on the basis of a household 
model,  in  most  cases  using  a  data  set  representative  of  all  program  beneficiaries.  Such 
techniques, while having the disadvantage of not measuring the actual impacts of a program, 
can be particularly useful in addressing some of the questions mentioned above. At the same 
time  these  techniques,  which  rely  on  structural  models  of  economic  behavior,  are  often 
criticized about the strong underlying assumptions that are necessary. Bourguignon, Ferreira 
and Leite (2003) (henceforth BFL) propose such a behavioral model that allows policymakers to 
evaluate the potential effect of a CCT on poverty, inequality and school enrollment rates. The 
model  combines  arithmetic  methods  with  models  of  demand  for  schooling,  generating 
predictions about the potential occupational choice (one of which is the decision of going to 
school) of a child living in a region where a CCT is implemented. The BFL model generates 
estimates  of  likely  effects  of  a  monetary  transfer  program,  comparing  the  simulated 
occupational choice of children with the status quo (absence of the CCT), keeping everything 
else constant. 
The evaluation literature in most part considers ex ante and ex post methods as competing or 
substitute  methods.  Ravallion  (2008)  underscores  that  the  two  approaches  can  instead  be 
complementary – combining an ex post evaluation with an ex ante structural model of schooling 4 
choices would allow policymakers to expand the existing set of policy alternatives in considering 
the optimal design of a given program. While this is true in principle, in order for the two 
approaches to complement each other in the context of a specific program, the consistency of 
the results produced by the two approaches would be an important consideration. The concerns 
about the validity of assumptions that underlie the ex ante behavioral models make it all the 
more important that their predictions are checked for consistency with the results of ex post 
experimental evaluations. Any evidence to suggest that ex ante approaches yield results that are 
at least broadly consistent with those from methodologically sound experimental evaluations 
would strengthen the case for using such approaches to complement ex post evaluations of 
similar programs in future, where the relative ease of employing ex ante approaches can be 
particularly useful in evaluating alternative design options before a program is implemented.  
Our paper represents an attempt to generate evidence on the consistency between the two 
approaches in the context of CCT programs by comparing ex ante predictions with results of ex 
post experimental evaluations, following the suggestion of Bourguignon and Ferreira (2003). 
Specifically,  we  compare  the  school  enrollment,  poverty  and  inequality  impacts  of  a  CCT 
program  generated  ex  ante,  using  the  behavioral  model  suggested  by  BFL,  with  the 
corresponding impacts estimated ex post from a randomized experiment involving the same 
program. The exercise is conducted for a number of CCT programs, of which the results of two 
exercises are presented in detail. 
The comparison presented in this paper is a validation test of the strongest hypothesis of the 
BFL model: that the cross-sectional income effects estimated  ex ante with a  representative 
household sample would coincide with the ex post estimates of income effects generated by the 
program.  The  ex  ante  simulation  of  the  impact  of  CCTs  on  enrolment  rate  and  poverty  is 
conducted using the same baseline surveys that are used for the experimental evaluations of 
PROGRESA in Mexico and Bono de Desarrollo Humano (henceforth BDH) in Ecuador. The full set 
of ex ante predictions are then compared with the highly credible and accepted ex post results 
presented  in  Skoufias  and  Parker  (2001)  and  Schultz  (2000)  for  PROGRESA  and  Schady  and 
Araújo (2008) for BDH. The choice of these programs for the exercise is partly to do with the fact 
that  they  represent  large  and  well-known  CCT  programs  that  contain  many  of  the  typical 
features of such programs. Equally important for our purposes is that for both these programs, 
the  randomization  of  program  implementation  allowed  researchers  to  conduct 5 
methodologically sound experimental evaluations. As a result, the results of these evaluations 
provide an appropriate benchmark against which ex ante predictions using the BFL model can be 
compared.  The  use  of  the  baseline  data  from  these  evaluations  to  generate  the  ex  ante 
predictions ensures that the ex ante simulations are based on the very same household sample 
on which the program impacts are estimated ex post. 
Section  II  below  reviews  the  literature  most  relevant  to our  analysis.  Section  III  provides  a 
synopsis of the BFL model, including its underlying assumptions and how it works. Section IV 
discusses the two CCT programs on which the BFL model will be applied (PROGRESA and BDH), 
the data to be used for the analysis and the ex post evaluation studies that provide benchmark 
results. Section V presents the results of the comparison between the predictions of the BFL 
model and results of ex post evaluations. Section VI concludes the paper. 
II. Review of the Literature 
Our review of relevant literature consists of two related parts. Given the topic of our paper, it is 
important to discuss earlier work done by a number of researchers comparing results from ex 
ante models and ex post evaluations. Since we use results from experimental ex post evaluations 
as the yardstick to test the validity of ex ante predictions, it is also important to look back at 
some of the seminal literature, going back to a few decades, concerned with the predictive 
power  of  non-experimental  estimators  against  the  benchmark  of  experimental  evaluation 
results.  
The act of forecasting outcomes is frequently subject to criticism, as it relies on estimation of 
parameters that are sensitive to model specification and to non-observable errors. Forecasts 
about  the  impacts  of  social  programs  are  typically validated  by  comparing  results  with  the 
estimated treatment effects from randomized experiments when they are available. Examples 
of such analyses include Todd and Wolpin (2004, 2006), Attanasio et al (2002) and de Janvry and 
Sadoulet (2006) for the Mexican case and Lise et al (2003) for the Canadian Self-Sufficiency 
Project (SSP).
2 
                                                           
2 The SSP is a social program providing time-limited earnings supplements to Income Assistance recipients 
who are able to obtain full time employment within a 12 month period. 6 
Todd  and  Wolpin  (2006)  use  an  ex  ante  model  to  generate  child  schooling  estimates  that 
compare reasonably well with experimental results. For children aged 12-15 years, the model 
predicts  the  effects  of  PROGRESA  on  school  enrollments  to  be  in  the  same  direction  as 
experimental results, but underestimates them by 21-25 percent. However, when the sample is 
disaggregated into age groups of 12-13 years and 14-15 years, the results compare less well, 
particularly among boys. The ex ante model does not predict any change in outcomes for boys 
aged 12-13 years and significantly overestimates the effects of the program for the 14-15 years 
age group. Todd and Wolpin also use a particular sample that is not comparable with the one 
used by Skoufias and Parker (2001) and Schultz (2000) to generate ex post results.  They restrict 
their sample of analysis from the original 24,077 households surveyed under PROGRESA to only 
landless households where the spouse of the household head is a woman under 50 years of age, 
reducing their data sample to 3,401 households (and then by 209 more due to data problems). 
Attanasio  et  al  (2005)  present  a  complex  model  to  simulate  ex  ante  the  likely  effects  of 
PROGRESA, as well as that of a hypothetical program that differs from PROGRESA in the way the 
transfers vary by the grade attended by the child. They do not compare the results of the first 
exercise with ex post results and instead only present the ex ante program impacts for different 
age groups. According to our computations using their estimates, the change in enrollment due 
to PROGRESA predicted by their model translates to enrollment increases of approximately 2 
and  5.4  percent  among  children  of  age  10-13  years  and  14-17  years  respectively.
3  In 
comparison, the enrollment increases attributed to PROGRESA – as estimated by the ex post 
evaluations of Skoufias and Parker (2001) and Schultz (2000) – are 2.4 and 7.5  percent  for 
children of age 10-13 years and 14-17 years, respectively. The Attanasio et al model is thus able 
to generate predictions that match up quite well with ex post evaluation results, even as its 
complexity and challenges of implementation are considerable.
4 
Leite (2007)  applies the BFL model to data from PNAD ( Pesquisa  Nacional  por  Amostra  de 
Domicílios) 1999 in Brazil to forecast an increase of 3.9 percent in the enrollment rate of poor 
                                                           
3  Our  computations  involve  extrapolating  from  the  enrollment  difference  presented  in  Figure  1  of 
Attanasio et al (2005), by assigning weights to each age group in Figure 1 and using the baseline survey. 
4 These authors also propose the use of a structural model to analyze issues that remain unexplored by 
standard Difference-in-Difference (henceforth DID) estimators. For example, they estimate that the 
performance of PROGRESA could have been improved by offering more resources to older age cohorts of 
children such as secondary school students and less to younger age cohorts or primary school students. 7 
children of age 10-15 years. This result is in the ballpark of the actual 3 percent increase in 
enrolment for the same cohort of boys between 1999 and 2003 estimated from PNAD 2003, 
which is not a result from an impact evaluation. The forecast from the BFL model is also close to 
the results from a quasi-experimental evaluation of the Bolsa Escola program by Cardoso and 
Souza (2004), in which a matching estimator suggests a 3.1 percent increase in the enrollment 
rate in boys and 3.0 percent increase for girls aged 10-15 years associated with the Bolsa Escola. 
De Janvry and Sadoulet (2006) also use PROGRESA data to develop a predictive model. They 
analyze the potential for increase in school attendance in order to help increase the efficiency of 
such transfers, concentrating on secondary school attendance and the extent to which it can be 
affected by a conditional transfer.  
Lise et al (2003) work with data from the Canadian Self-Sufficiency Project (SSP) and construct a 
dynamic, partial equilibrium model to simulate the effects of the program in terms of labor 
market behavior and compare these to observed treatment effects on individuals. The SSP is a 
social program providing time-limited earnings supplements to Income Assistance recipients 
who are able to obtain full time employment within a 12 month period. Recipients (i.e. the 
treatment group) of SSP were picked at random from among those eligible for these benefits. 
Lise et al restrict their sample to single mothers only, with around 2,300 women in the control 
and treatment groups alike.
5 Their ex ante model is calibrated to control group data and the 
experiment  is simulated within this model to imitate the “welfare-to-work transition of the 
treatment group.”
6 The results are then compared with those of an ex post evaluation of the 
SSP, which produces similar results. 
An earlier body of literature, including LaLonde (1986), Heckman and Hotz (1989) and others, 
use  experimental  results  as  benchmarks  for  evaluating  the  predictive  power  of  partial 
equilibrium  non-experimental  estimators,  mainly  in  the  context  of  labor  market  programs. 
These  papers  concluded  that  non-experimental  methods  were  not  effective  in  evaluating 
program  impacts.  In  more  recent  literature,  propensity  score  matching  was  extended  with 
                                                           
5 Lise et al’s calibrated search-matching model incorporates three segments of the market: employed 
individuals, unemployed individuals receiving unemployment benefits, and individuals receiving income 
supplements through IA. The model expands on Davidson and Woodbury (1993)’s equilibrium search 
model by assuming that expected lifetime income is maximized by individuals when they choose their 
employment state and the intensity with which they seek work if unemployed. 
6 For further details, please see Lise, Seitz and Smith (2003) 8 
kernel and local linear matching estimators, which use multiple nonparticipants to estimate the 
outcomes  of  the  control  group  as  opposed  to  pair-wise  estimation.  This  method,  used  by 
Heckman et al. (1997) and Heckman et al. (1998), was implemented with longitudinal and cross-
sectional  data  from  the  National  Supported  Work  Demonstration,  another  labor  market 
program.
7 The results suggest that such estimators are able to replicate experimental results 
only when the data examined are  very similar – from the same source(s), with treatment and 
control groups from the same geographic labor markets, and incorporating a range of variables 
that influence both participation and labor market outcomes.
8 
McKenzie et al  (2006)  build  on  the  finding  of  previous  authors:  the  best  non-experimental 
estimates are obtained when the treatment and control groups are drawn from the same labor 
markets, data sources used are the same, and groups’ characteristics are similar in that the 
“likelihood of receiving the treatment is similar in both groups.” They compare experimental 
and non-experimental methods in analyzing the income gains from migration, using a survey on 
the quota of Tongans allowed to immigrate to New Zealand each year on the basis of a lottery 
from an excess number of applicants. They generate experimental estimates of income gain 
from migration by comparing gains of applicants whose names were not drawn in the lottery 
with those who immigrated through the lottery, after taking into account those who did not 
immigrate  even  after  they  “won”  the  lottery.  They  also  survey  a  non-applicant  group  and 
generate non-experimental estimates for comparison with the experimental estimates. Because 
migrants are more likely to have certain observable and unobservable characteristics (such as 
ability and drive), the non-experimental methods are shown to overstate income gains from 
migration by between 9 and 82 percent.  
The  ex  ante  labor  market  models  described  here  suggest  the  difficulties  in  predicting  the 
impacts of a program using a model representing standard economic incentives incorporated 
through wages. In our paper, however, the effects of programs are simulated using a model 
incorporating household income, where the incentives operate through channels that are quite 
different.  
                                                           
7 NSW was a subsidized work experience program providing recipients with training and assistance in 
finding regular jobs. 
8 Summarized from Smith and Todd (2006). 9 
Against the backdrop of the existing literature discussed above, the main contribution of our 
paper is in terms of testing the validity of an ex ante tool for evaluating the impacts of CCT 
programs (the BFL model) that is operationally useful, both in terms of ease of implementation 
and data requirements. Compared to the dynamic ex ante models suggested by Attanasio et al 
and Todd and Wolpin (see above), the BFL model makes fewer demands on data requirements 
and do not rely on the availability of panel data, as it employs a reduced-form approach that 
imposes simplifying assumptions on household behavior. If the predictions of the BFL model 
with all its simplicity were to compare well with the impacts measured by rigorous ex post 
evaluations, it would be a practical and credible ex ante tool for policymakers to employ during 
the design and planning phase of CCT programs.  
III. Ex Ante Simulation with the BFL Model
9 
This section presents a summary description of the BFL model, used as the ex ante evaluation 
tool in this paper (a more detailed discussion of the model can be found in the original BFL 
paper).  Rather than constructing a complete structural model of demand for schooling and 
intra-household labor allocation, the BFL model aims to obtain reasonable orders of magnitude 
for the likely effects of cash transfers that are conditional on school attendance. The structural 
aspects of modeling are thus kept to the minimum necessary to capture the main effects of the 
program. There are four key underlying assumptions. Firstly, occupational choice is assumed to 
reflect (in reduced form) the end result of whatever decision-making process about a child’s 
time allocation unfolds in a household, regardless of how the decision is made. Secondly, the 
decision to send a child to school is assumed to be made after all occupational decisions by 
adults within the household have been made, so that the schooling decision does not affect 
those earlier decisions. Thirdly, the model does not allow for decisions about the occupational 
choice of multiple siblings in a household to be made simultaneously or jointly. Fourthly, the 
composition of the household is taken as exogenous. While each of these assumptions is an 
                                                           
9 A toolkit for running the BFL model was prepared by the World Bank. The toolkit provides a how-to 
guide in the application of the BFL micro-simulation model that enables users to analyze and compare 
several alternative scenarios on the basis on representative household survey data. It can thus be used in 
selecting the most cost-effective design or it can be used for sensitivity and cost-benefit analysis. The 
toolkit can be downloaded at www.worldbank.org/safetynets under toolkit or by clicking on the following 
hyperlink: BFL model toolkit 10 
abstraction from reality (at least for some households), they make for a simple, reduced-form 
approach that is tractable with the baseline data available for most programs. 
Let j =0 be the occupational category of “not attending school,” j =1 be that of “attending school 
and working,” and j =2 be that of “attending school only.” Following the approach adopted in 
BFL, the utility function of child i corresponding to each occupational category j is given by the 
following:
10 
                                                       
Where Zi are the characteristics of both the child and the household, Y-i is the household income 
without the child’s earnings, yij is the child’s income earned in alternative j; and vij is the random 
variable representing idiosyncratic preferences. γj and αj are parameters specific to occupational 
category j. The model is parsimonious in its representation of occupational choice of children 
and  allows  for  all  possible  trade-offs  between  current  income  of  the  household  and  the 
schooling  of  the  child.
11  A key variable is  the  child’s  earning  yij  since  transfers  depend  on 
household income and the schooling/occupational status of a child, which in itself affects the 
child’s earning.  
The model implicitly treats the child's number of hours of work as a discrete choice between 3 
alternatives, corresponding to the 3 occupational categories given by j. It seems reasonable to 
define child i’s earning in occupational category 0 as equal to her observed market earnings 
denoted by wi, since no time is spent on schooling. Assuming that earnings can be characterized 
by the standard Becker-Mincer human capital model, wi is given by: 
                                                  
Where Xi is a set of individual characteristics (including age and schooling achieved) and ui is a 
random term that stands for unobserved determinants of earnings. The second term on the 
right hand side is a dummy variable representing the fact that a child who attends school and 
                                                           
10 See equation (2) in the BFL paper, which in turn is the linearized version of a more general specification 
given by equation (1) in their paper. 
11 Note that the model can also implicitly represent a trade-off between current income of the household 
and future income of the child (and perhaps the household as well), since schooling would be expected to 
raise his/her future income 11 
works  for  wages  has  less  time  available  and  is  therefore  likely  to  earn  less.  The  child's 
contribution to the household income (yij,) in the various alternative categories for j is given by: 
                                                               
                  
Where  yij  covers  income  from  both  market-based  and  domestic  work  done  by  child  i  in 
occupational category j. Being in category 1, namely attending school while working outside the 
household,  leads  to  a  reduction  in  total  income  (relative  to  income  in  category  0)  by  the 
proportion (1-M). Similarly, going to school without working in the market leads to a reduction 
in total income by the proportion (1-D).
12 While D is not observed, M is assumed to be the same 
for domestic and market work and  can be estimated from observed earnings represented by 
equation (2) above. Replacing (3) in equation (1): 
                                                        
                                        
Child i (or the household of child i) will choose the occupational category j that yields the highest 
utility among the 3 alternatives. Assuming that all parameters of equation (2) are known, along 
with actual or potential earnings (wi) and the residual terms (vij), household’s selection of a 
child’s occupation can then be defined by: 
                                              
If  a  CCT  program  is  implemented  where  all  children  going  to  school  receive  a  transfer  T, 
equation (4) becomes: 
                                                               
                                
Equation (6) adds a transfer amount T to the part of household income that is independent of 
the  child’s  income,  conditional  on  the  child  going  to  school.  Thus  in  maximizing  the  utility 
function given by (6), the household must take into account the fact that it will receive T only in 
states (j=1) or (j=2). Under the assumptions made earlier, equation (6) is the full reduced-form 
model of the occupational choice of children, which would allow for simulations of the impact of 
                                                           
12 Note that total income in category 1 can be a combination of incomes from market and domestic work 
of the child, while total income in category 2 is from domestic child work only. 12 
CCT transfers on those choices, once the estimates of the parameters of the model as well those 
of wi and vij's are obtained. 
Estimation of discrete choice model 
An  assumption  that  the  vij  are  independently  and  identically  distributed  across  sample 
observations with a double exponential distribution leads to the well-known multinomial logit 
model, which can be used to estimate equation (6), where j=0, 1, 2 are the three alternative 
categories of occupation the household can choose between. The estimation of parameters is 
complicated by the nature of the model, which only allows the coefficients corresponding to a 
given category to be estimated as a deviation from those of a reference category. To see this, 
we start by noting that the probability a child/household i will select occupational choice k is 
given by: 
      
                             
                                 
              
Taking (j = 0) as the reference state or occupation category, (7) can be written as: 
      
                                                  
                                                          
   
             
                                      
Multinomial logit estimation permits the estimation of only the differences (αj-α0), (βj-β0), and 
(γj-γ0) for j = 1, 2. Since the transfer is conditional on the child being in state 1 or 2, the income 
variable               is  asymmetric  across  alternatives.  Thus  in  order  to  find  the  utility 
maximizing alternative (k
*), it is necessary to find estimates of the coefficients α0, α1 and α2, for 
which the structural assumptions listed in equation (4) are useful.  
Let      and      be the estimated coefficients of the multinomial logit model corresponding to the 
income and the child earning variables for alternatives (j = 1) and (j= 2), the alternative (j=0) 
being taken as the reference. Using equation (4) we get the following system of equations:
13 
                                                                               
                                                           
13 To obtain (9), recall from (4) that:                             and that:                for j=1, 2. 13 
Which is equivalent to 
   
           
     
                                     
         
  
            
Using (9a), we can derive estimates of α0, α1, α2 and D from the estimated coefficients of the 
multinomial logit and M; where M is obtained from the estimation of equation (2). In estimating 
the residual terms (vij-vi0), it is important to recall that these cannot be observed in a discrete 
choice model, and can instead only be known to belong to certain intervals. Thus the residual 
term for each child is drawn from the relevant interval, which is to say, in a way consistent with 
that child’s observed choice of occupational category.
14 
Finally,  we  note  that  equation  (6)  is  not  easily  estimated  without  variable  wi,  which  is 
unobservable for children who are not in the labor market. The most rigorous approach would 
be to estimate the discrete choice model and the earning equation simultaneously by maximum 
likelihood techniques – a cumbersome procedure.
15 Correcting the estimation of the earning 
function  for a selection bias  turns out to  be  problematic  as well  (see discussion in BFL) .
16 
Instead, the BFL model uses a simple approach, which has the advantage of transparency and 
robustness. This consists of estimating equation (2) by OLS, which is then used to  predict the 
potential wage wi for children who are not in the labor market. A random term ui is added to the 
predicted  earning  of  each  non-working  child  to  account  for  unobserved  heterogeneity,  by 
drawing from the distribution generated by the residuals of the OLS. 
Simulating the impacts of a CCT program 
Using  the  estimation  steps  described  above,  the outcomes of  a  given  CCT program  can  be 
simulated with equations (5) and (6), but with the additional step of introducing a “means test” 
to identify eligible beneficiaries, which is a feature in CCT programs like PROGRESA and BDH. 
                                                           
14 For instance if child i has chosen state or category 1, the terms (vij-vi0) must be drawn so as to satisfy the 
inequality:                                                                                               .  
15 To handle simultaneously the random terms of the discrete choice model and that of the earning 
equation, a multinomial probit would then be preferable to a multinomial logit. This would then however 
pose the difficult challenge of integrating tri-variate normal distributions. 
16 Proper identification using the inverse Mill’s ratio to correct the earnings equation for election bias 
requires  variables/instruments  which influence earnings  but not the occupational/schooling choice of 
children.) Such variables are not readily available from the data. Moreover, the standard correction using 
a two stage procedure is even weaker in the case of more than two choices. 14 
The means test is represented by assuming that the transfer T is provided only if household 
income is less than or equal to a pre-determined threshold Y0. Taking into account both the 
means-test and the conditionality of child attending school, child (household) i would choose 
the  state  or  occupational  category  that  yields  the  maximum  utility  among  the  following 
alternatives: 
                                    
                                                                   
                                                                                              
                                                             
                                                                   
As  explained earlier,  the estimation  of  the  multinomial  logit  regression,  combined  with  the 
relationships shown in (9a), allows us to simulate the utility maximizing decision for household i 
to choose among the alternatives specified in (10). It is easy to see that the introduction of a 
transfer  can  induce  households  to  move  from  occupational  category  0  (no  schooling)  to 
category 1 or 2, and also from 1 to 2 if it were the case that the household qualifies for the 
transfer only when the child went to school and stopped working.  
The framework in (10) can be used to simulate the impacts of a variety of CCT programs that are 
conditional upon schooling enrollment, allowing for both the means test and transfer to be 
dependent on individual or household characteristics (e.g. transfer amount varying according to 
age or gender of the child). That said, important caveats or limitations apply to this framework, 
which are closely related to the assumptions set out at the beginning of this section. Firstly, the 
model cannot account for the effects of any upper limit on transfers going to a single household, 
which is a direct result of the model ignoring the possibility that decisions affecting multiple 
children in a household may be made simultaneously. Secondly, household income excluding 
the  earnings  of  the  child  is  treated  as  exogenous.  This  does  not  take  into  account  for  the 
possibility of the means test affecting adult labor supply – for example, when an adult decides to 
not participate in the labor market if the extra income makes the household ineligible for the 
CCT program. While this can be a serious issue when eligibility is defined by actual (or observed) 15 
income, it is less so when eligibility is defined by a score-based “proxy” means test that attempts 
to reflect permanent income.
17 
IV. Programs and Data Description 
PROGRESA  was  launched  in  Mexico  at  a  time  when  economic  growth  was  found  to  be 
insufficiently pro-poor and existing safety net programs were seen as ineffective (Coady, 2004). 
PROGRESA  was  designed  to  alleviate  poverty  in  both  the  short  and  long  run,  by  making 
monetary transfers to poor families while requiring that they invest in the human capital of their 
children. Renamed Opportunidades in 2003, PROGRESA provides monetary grants to selected 
families (and usually to the mothers) conditional on children being enrolled in and regularly 
attending school, and on all family members attending scheduled visits to health care centers.
18 
The educational grant is provided for each poor child under the age of 18 years and enrolled in 
school between the 3
rd grade of primary and 3
rd grade of secondary level. The grant amount is 
adjusted every six months for inflation and varies by school grade and gender, increasing as 
children progress to higher grades (see Appendix, Table A-1). The grant is intended to reverse 
two observed tendencies among poor Mexican communities: older children are more likely to 
work, which implies that the opportunity cost of going to school increases with the grade level, 
and girls have higher dropout rates than boys at the secondary level. The health and nutrition 
grants components are intended to improve health indicators through regular visits to health 
care  centers  for  all  family  members  and  enhance  food  consumption  through  nutritional 
supplements, especially for children under the age of 2 years and pregnant and breastfeeding 
women.
19 
                                                           
17 Typically the proxy means test score is determined by factors such as ownership of durable goods and 
assets  like  land,  housing  conditions,  education  and  occupational  status  of  household  members,  and 
demographic characteristics like number of children and dependency ratio – none of which are directly 
influenced by the decision of an adult member to participate in the labor market. 
18 For a more detailed description of  PROGRESA see Skoufias and Parker (2001) or Parker and Skoufias 
(2000). 
19 Skoufias and Parker  (2001)  present this component as two components: (i) health, providing basic 
healthcare for all members o f the family without including any monetary transfer, and (ii) nutrition, 
including a fixed monetary transfer. 16 
PROGRESA was first implemented during the first half of 1998 in 320 randomly assigned rural 
villages  out  of  506  villages  pre-qualified  for  immediate  participation.
20  The remaining  186 
villages  were  assigned  as  control  villages  and  receive d  their  first  monetary  transfers  in  
December 2000. Implementation of the program in a phased manner and random selection of 
program villages for the first phase of implementation were extremely important factors aiding 
rigorous evaluations of the program.
21 
The baseline survey (Encuesta Évaluation de los Hogares or ENCEL) for PROGRESA was collected 
in 1997 in all 506 pre-qualified villages, covering 24,077 households in seven states.
22 PROGRESA 
administrators ran a follow-up survey over the same set of households once every six months, 
generating a rich household panel dataset. Many evaluations of PROGRESA were conducted on 
the basis of these surveys, including the previously mentioned studies by Skoufias and Parker 
(2001), Parker and Skoufias (2000), Schultz (2004), Todd and Wolpin (2006), Attanasio et al. 
(2005), and Coady (2004). Overall results show an increase in the enrollment rates of both boys 
and girls at the primary and secondary levels, a reduction in the incidence of illness among 
children of age 0-5 years, an increase in the annual growth rate of children of age 12-36 months 
and a reduction in all poverty indices. PROGRESA (Opportunidades) is now covering around 5 
million households (18 percent of the country’s total population) with a budget equivalent to 0.4 
percent of GDP, contributing around 20 percent of the income of participating families. 
In  2003,  Ecuador  updated  Bono  Solidario,  its  existing  social  program  focusing  on  poverty 
reduction that had been created in 1999. The new program, Bono de Desarrollo Humano (BDH), 
is part of the Social Protection Plan of the Ministerio de Bienestar Social and re-targeted the 
transfers under the erstwhile Bono Solidario program. While the main purpose of BDH is to 
transfer cash to poor households, the transfers are also intended to be conditional on child 
enrollment and health care center visits. In its early days, compliance with the conditions was 
not monitored and consequently, non-complying households were not penalized. In order to 
                                                           
20 These villages were randomly selected out of 6,396 villages (4,546 considered to be in the treatment 
group and 1,850 in the control group) using probability proportional to size. Villages were identified on 
the  basis  of  a  community  score  based  on  information  available  from  national  census  data  regarding 
characteristics such as educational levels, occupational composition, and housing conditions. 
21 Further details are available in Skoufias and Parker (2001). 
22 The 7 states were: Guerrero, Hidalgo, Michoacan, Puebla, Queretaro, San Luis Potosi, and Veracruz. 17 
correct this, program administrators launched a large-scale campaign to stress the importance 
of compliance. 
Under BDH, beneficiary households (again the mothers) receive grants of US$15 per month on 
the condition that children of ages 6-16 years are regularly enrolled, with at least  a school 
attendance rate of at least 80 percent per month. Poor households with children of ages 0-5 
years, additionally, have to fulfill the condition that they make scheduled visits to health centers 
for growth and development checkups and immunizations.
23 According to Schady and Araújo 
(2006), the monthly US$15 transfers account for only 7 percent of household expenditure. BDH 
coverage reached approximately one million households (5 million people), covering 40 percent 
of the Ecuadorian population with an estimated cost of 0.6 percent of GDP in 2005.  
The baseline survey, collected between June and August 2003 for the evaluation of the BDH 
program, was drawn from four of 22 Ecuadorian provinces around the country.
24 Within all four 
provinces,  “paroquias”  (parishes)  were  randomly  assigned.  For  each  selected  paroquia,  a 
random household sample was selected, generating a total sample size of 1,488 households. 
Around 90.5 percent of the household sample had at least one child aged 6 to 17 years at the 
time of the follow-up survey. None of the households in the sample were enrolled in BDH or 
Bono Solidario prior to the sample selection. Thereafter, some of the sample households were 
selected for immediate participation in the program while others were not eligible to receive 
any transfer in the first two years. The follow-up survey took place between January and March 
2005  and  collected  information  on  households  after  program  implementation,  generating  a 
panel sample of 1,306 households (2,875 children between six and seventeen years of age).  
According to Schady and Araújo (2008), around 27 percent of households in both treatment and 
control groups had stated that school attendance was a prerequisite for receiving BDH grants, 
despite the fact that the program administrator had never enforced any conditions. BDH was 
found to have a positive impact on school enrollment and a negative impact on child work; the 
                                                           
23 The transfers can be collected at any office of the Banred (the largest network of private banks in 
Ecuador) or from the National Agricultural Bank. 
24 The 4 provinces were Carchi, Imbabura, Cotopaxi, and Tungurahua.  18 
fact that households believed school attendance to be mandatory may explain the scale of these 
program effects.
25  
V. Comparison between Ex Ante and Ex Post Estimates of Program Impact
26 
The BFL model as described in Section III can be used to simulate school enrolment (and labor 
participation of children) in the presence of the CCT program, which can then be compared with 
the outcomes for the counterfactual – namely, the observed scenario in the absence of CCT. 
When the simulation is conducted with the treatment group – a sub-sample of the full baseline 
survey sample – the impact obtained may be considered as an estimate of the “Average Intent 
to  Treat”  (henceforth  AIT)  because  it  simulates  the  impact  of  the  CCT  program  on  the 
enrollment rate among all eligible children, regardless of whether they accept the transfer or 
not. Even if a child is eligible to receive the transfer, if the amount of transfer is insufficient to 
move him/her from category 0 to 1 or 2, the household would not accept the transfer and 
consequently, the transfer is not allocated to the household in the simulation.
27  
The AIT estimator is then given by: 
                                                                          
Where P
* is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if children would be enrolled in school after 
receiving  transfer  T  and  P  is  a  dummy variable  taking  the  value 1  if  children  are  currently 
enrolled in school. AIT* provides an estimate of the average impact of the availability of the 
program to eligible households in treatment communities.   
Two  aspects  of  the  ex  ante  AIT  estimator  must  be  noted.  Firstly,  it  assumes  good 
implementation  of  program  in  treatment  communities.  While  the  simulation  accounts  for 
eligible households opting to not receive the transfer and send their children to school, it does 
not  account  for  “exclusion  errors”  in  targeting  whereby  households  eligible  and  willing  to 
                                                           
25 Interestingly, these results suggest that even if the conditionalities of a CCT program are not enforced, 
just announcing the conditions may be enough to have some impact on behavior of participants. 
26 Similar analysis for Nicaraguan Red de Protección Social  (RPS) program was performed by the authors 
and main findings presented in this section also hold for the RPS program.  Authors omitted the RPS 
analysis due to the length of the article but results are available per request (See Appendix, Table A-12 for 
summary results). 
27 In maximizing its utility, an eligible household will decide to not accept the transfer if U(0) > U(1) even 
when Y-I + M.wi  ≤ Y0, and U(0) > U(2) even when Y-I  ≤ Y0 19 
receive the transfer (complying with its condition of sending children to school) are left out of 
the program. Neither does it take into account other types of implementation flaws, including 
“inclusion errors” of non-eligible households receiving the transfers, lack of compliance with the 
conditions of the transfer, or schools being unable to accommodate increase in enrollments. 
Secondly, due to the nature of the BFL model, the ex ante AIT estimator does not take into 
account any time trend effects on outcomes on which impacts are measured. Given this, it is 
best to compare the ex ante AIT estimate with ex post AIT estimates obtained using double-
difference or difference in difference (DID) method whenever possible – recognizing that this ex 
post method removes the time trend effect from the estimated impact. 
The impact of PROGRESA 
We  compare  the  simulated  ex  ante  impact  of  PROGRESA,  applying  the  BFL  model  on  the 
baseline survey (from 1997 – see section IV for details), with ex post results from Skoufias and 
Parker (2001). To make this comparison possible, all income variables from the baseline survey 
are converted into November 1999 pesos, and transfer amounts corresponding to the second 
half of 1999 (see Appendix, Table A-1 for the amounts) are applied in the simulations.  
The selected sample comprises only children who were of age 8-17 years at the time of the 
baseline survey in 1997. Given how the BFL model is set up, the data from the follow-up survey 
on the same children, which is to say the panel data, is not utilized for the simulation. Out of the 
33,609 children in the baseline sample the simulation was applied to, around 30 percent were 
not attending school, while only around 4 percent of children were combining work outside the 
household with school. Children not attending school were on the average older and with higher 
education  level  than  those  who  were  in  school  and  not  working.  Households  with  higher 
dropout rates were not necessarily poorer, indicating the importance of child income for the 
household. Child earnings increased with age and girls were more likely to drop out than boys, 
but boys were more likely to work and attend school simultaneously (see Appendix, Table A-2 
for all descriptive statistics). Average household size was similar (around 7 members) for the 3 
groups of children and more educated parents were more likely to have children in school.  
Enrollment patterns across age groups are important to note as well, with implications for how 
program impacts should be estimated. Dropout rates increase sharply around the age when 
children are expected to complete primary schooling, rising from 7 percent at age 11 to nearly 20 
17 percent at age 12 and increasing exponentially thereafter to reach nearly 82 percent at age 
of 17. Because of the vast differences in enrollment across age groups, Skoufias and Parker 
suggest that the sample of children aged 8 to 17 years must be divided into two groups in 
assessing the potential impact of the program: children of primary school age (8-11 years) and 
those of secondary school age (12-17 years).  
The experimental design of PROGRESA ensures in theory that all possible sources of bias were 
evenly  distributed  among  participants  and  non-participants,  allowing  us  to  strictly  attribute 
differences  between  treatment  and  control  groups  to  program  effect.
28  However, different 
papers have analyzed the pre-program composition and characteristics of treatment and control 
groups  in  detail,  suspecting  that  despite  randomization  the  two  groups  were  not  fully 
comparable. Skoufias and Parker also find some evidence of systematic differences between the 
two groups and propose that a double-difference (DID) estimator, which takes into account any 
pre-existing differences, is preferable in evaluating the impacts of PROGRESA.
29 
To be consistent with the  Skoufias and Parker’s methodology for ex post evaluation, the BFL 
model is estimated (see appendix for model specification and estimations) for all boys and girls 
aged 8-17 years in the baseline sample, and the results are presented separately for three age 
groups and gender categories. This generates results for six age-gender categories.  
Following the argument at the beginning of this section, the ex ante AIT estimator generated by 
the BFL model (see (11) above) can be compared directly with the ex post results from Skoufias 
and Parker (Tables 5 and 6), who use the sample of all eligible households and measure the 
direct effect of the “intent to treat”, regardless of whether they in fact received a transfer or 
not. The ex post AIT estimates should be seen as a lower bound of the impact on households 
that actually received treatment, since the observed impact also includes the effect of flaws in 
program targeting, which would dilute the impact on eligible households (for example, when 
mis-targeting results in an eligible household being left out of the program). These estimates are 
derived from a regression-based approach that yields the DID estimate of the program’s impact 
                                                           
28 Heckman, La Londe and Smith (1999). 
29 Also, Behrman and Todd (1999) found the null hypothesis of mean equality with respect to household 
characteristics between treatment and control group to be rejected more frequently than expected. 21 
in each round (of the follow-up surveys), which is net of any preprogram differences between 
treatment and control households and any time trends in the values of the outcome indicator. 
Skoufias and Parker (in Figures 4a and 4b of their paper) show that the mean school attendance 
rate of both boys and girls were nearly identical for control and treatment villages at the outset 
of the program. For treatment villages, the enrollment rate among boys was higher than that of 
girls in the baseline year, where the difference is entirely a result of the higher dropout rate 
among girls of age 12-17 years (Table 1). For the age group 8-11 years, enrollment was high at 
around 94 percent for both boys and girls. 
Table 1: Impact of Transfers on Children’s Occupational Choice (1997-1999) 
Actual and counterfactual school enrollment rates for PROGRESA target population 
  













8-17 years-old  74.5%  -  4.0% 
**  -0.1% 




8-11 years-old  93.8%  1.8% 
**  0.0% 
 
-0.1% 






12-17 years-old  57.5%  5.8% 
**  5.9% 
**  0.0% 









8-17 years-old  69.4%  -  4.3% 
**  -0.1% 















12-17 years-old  47.9%  9.5% 
**  6.6% 









Source: Baseline Survey 1997 and Rounds 1-4;authors' calculation. 
Note: 
1: Results from Skoufias and Parker (2001) - Table 6 (only the results for November 1999 are 
reported). The coefficients reported are the marginal effects of the PROGRESA program on 
the probability of attending school;  
2: Results from simulation on baseline data using BFL model 
** Significant at 5% level; 
* Significant at 10% level. 
Standard errors and standard deviations in parentheses. For ex post AIT, robust standard 
errors are shown, which account for clustering of individuals within villages. For ex ante AIT, 
standard deviations computed by bootstrap method. 
 
Table 1 shows the AIT estimates of impact of PROGRESA on school enrollment rates by age and 
gender (Skoufias and Parker, henceforth SP) as well as the ex ante AIT estimates using the BFL 
simulation model. Ex ante estimates are also shown for a hypothetical case where the transfer is 22 
unconditional, namely provided to all potential beneficiaries, regardless of whether they are 
enrolled in school or not.  The ex ante AIT (conditional) estimates compare quite well with the ex 
post estimates. Both types of estimates show the impact of PROGRESA on enrollment to be 
much higher among children of age 12-17 years than children of age 8-11 years, and higher 
among girls than boys in the 12-17 age group. While the ex ante and ex post estimates are 
almost identical for boys of age 12-17 and girls of age 8-11, the ex ante estimates understate the 
impact for girls of age 12-17 and boys of age 8-11. Boys of age 8-11 years are the only group for 
which the two types of estimates disagree on whether there is any significant impact or not – 
the ex post estimate show a small positive impact while the ex ante estimate is not different 
from zero. The confidence intervals of ex ante and ex post estimates for the same group overlay 
each other to a large extent. One advantage of ex ante methods is that they allow for the 
simulation of hypothetical scenarios. In the hypothetical case where transfers are unconditional, 
the simulated effect on enrollment rate is found to be zero for all age/gender groups. 
Table 2: Impact of Transfers on Children’s Occupational Choice (1997-1999) 
Actual and counterfactual proportions of children working for PROGRESA target population 
  













8-17 years-old  23.0% 
 
-2.6% 
**  0.0% 
















12-17 years-old  37.3%  -4.7% 
**  -3.7% 
**  0.0% 








8-17 years-old  9.7% 
 
-0.7% 
*  0.0% 
















12-17 years-old  14.6%  -2.3% 
*  -1.3% 
*  0.0% 






Source: Baseline Survey 1997 and Rounds 1-4 – authors' calculation. 
Note: 1: Results from Skoufias and Parker (2001) - Table 5 (only the results for November 
1999 are reported). The coefficients reported are the marginal effects of the PROGRESA 
program on the probability of children working;  
2: Results from simulation on baseline data using BFL model 
** Significant at 5% level; 
* Significant at 10% level. 
Standard errors and standard deviations in parentheses. For  ex post AIT, robust standard 
errors are shown, which account for clustering of individuals within villages. For ex ante AIT, 
standard deviations computed by bootstrap method. 23 
 
Table 2 shows the results of a similar exercise comparing ex ante and ex post AIT estimates of 
the impact of transfers on the proportion of children who are working outside home. The ex 
ante  estimates  are  again quite  close  to the  ex  post  SP  estimates of  impact.  Both  methods 
indicate that PROGRESA has the impact of reducing the rate of child labor among 12-17 year 
olds, but not among 8-11 year olds – quite consistent with what was seen in terms of impact of 
enrollment using both methods. Among the 12-17 year olds, the program’s impact on child labor 
is larger for boys than for girls. For both boys and girls of the 12-17 year age group, the ex ante 
estimates understate the size of the impact relative to the ex post estimates. Consistent with 
what was seen for enrollment, the ex ante simulations with unconditional transfers show no 
impact on child labor, suggesting that the conditionality of the transfer was a crucial factor for 
the impacts.  
While it is encouraging to find that the BFL model has good predictive power when compared to 
results from ex post evaluations with experimental design, the similarity of results may be driven 
by  the  restricted  and  homogenous  nature  of  the baseline  sample  (of  ENCEL)  on  which  the 
simulations are run. Moreover, from a practical point of view, a specialized baseline survey of 
program areas may not be available in all cases to conduct ex ante simulations. CCT programs 
are often set up quickly responding to political needs or to utilize a brief window of opportunity, 
which  may  leave  little  time  for  baseline  data  collection.  In  such  cases,  a  nationally 
representative household survey, which has much more heterogeneity across households than 
any baseline survey, is often the only source of data available to conduct simulations on.  
Therefore, for methodological as well as practical reasons, it is useful to test the validity of ex 
ante predictions from the BFL model using the Mexican National Household Survey (ENIGH). 
This is done by estimating the key parameters of the BFL model (αj’s, M and D) for all children of 
age 12-17 years with ENIGH 1996 (the round that was the closest to the launch of PROGRESA), 
and  comparing  the  estimated  parameters  with  those  estimated  with  a  similar  model 
specification for the same age group of children from the ENCEL survey.  
The estimated parameters from ENIGH do not differ significantly from those estimated with the 
baseline survey (Table 3). For all key parameters, the 95 percent confident interval generated by 
ENIGH and ENCEL overlap each other and can thus be considered statistically similar. However, 24 
ENIGH parameters generate smaller program effects compared to the results in Table 1 because 
all the parameters are a little smaller in size than ENCEL-generated parameter estimates. These 
results confirm the findings of Leite (2007) for Brazil, which show that estimations based on a 
more heterogeneous sample such as the one surveyed in the national representative PNAD 
leads to smaller parameter estimates. By estimating the same set of parameters  for a sub-
sample of homogenous households, Leite (2007) found a much higher impact on the enrollment 
rate and reduction of child work.
30 
Table 3: Estimating Key Parameters from BFL model 
Using Baseline 1997 and Enigh 1996 Surveys 
Boys and Girls 
Baseline - ENCEL  Enigh 






























(14.8%)  (12.2%)  (9.9%) 
Source: Baseline Survey 1997 and ENIGH 1996 
Notes: 
** Significant at 5% level; 
* Significant at 10% level. Standard 
Deviations (in parentheses) computed by bootstrapping. 
  
The BFL model also makes the estimation of program effects on poverty and inequality possible, 
which is useful to examine the importance of PROGRESA as an anti-poverty program in the short 
                                                           
30 Leite (2007) estimates the set of parameters of interest using a sub-sample of children around the 
means test threshold. This is done by defining two homogenous groups – potential beneficiaries who are 
below the means test threshold (treatment) and non-beneficiaries who are above the threshold (control) 
– who have made their choices subject to similar income constraints. He finds that 65 percent of the 
movement of children out of the labor market that were already in school can be explained as a response 
to the Bolsa Escola. These two groups around the means test threshold, according to the Regression 
Discontinuity Design, are more likely to have similar observable and unobservable characteristics which 
would make it a good approximation of a randomized experiment. 25 
run. This is done by setting 750 pesos as a maximum transfer per household (consistent with the 
rules of PROGRESA), using the same poverty line as in Skoufias and Di Maro (2008)
31 and taking 
into  account  individual  level  decisions  through  the  BFL  model.  The  proportion  of  poor 
households in the baseline treatment village sample is estimated to be 61 percent, which is the 
same as in Skoufias and Di Maro. Applying the DID estimator on poverty measures, Skoufias and 
Di Maro find that between November 1997 and November 1999, PROGRESA was responsible for 
a 16.5, 24 and 27 percent reduction in the poverty headcount rate, poverty gap and squared 
poverty  gap,  respectively,  in  treatment villages.  In comparison to  their  results,  our  ex  ante 
simulations  suggest  a  similar  impact  of  PROGRESA  on  poverty  headcount  rate  (13  percent 
reduction), but a somewhat larger impact for poverty gap (27 percent reduction) and squared 
poverty gap (33 percent reduction).
32 Table 4 below shows these results.  
Table 4: Poverty Index: Observed (ex post) and Simulated (ex ante) 
   FGT(0)  FGT(1)  FGT(2) 
   %  σ  %  σ  %  σ 
Treatment Communities (baseline)  60.9%  1.1%  30.8%  1.1%  21.5%  1.1% 
 
     
 
  
    Change in poverty ex post: Skoufias and Di 
Maro (2008)
1  -16.5%  1.6%  -24.3%  1.5%  -29.2%  1.4% 
Change in poverty ex ante: Simulated
2  -13.1%  -26.6%  -33.1% 
Source: Baseline Survey 1997 and Rounds 1-4;  
1: Skoufias and Di Maro (2008), Table 4;  
2: authors' calculation using BFL model 
Notes: Prices of November 1999 (pesos); poverty line: mean of Nov 98 consumption per capita 
(taken from Skoufias and Di Maro, 2008) 
The final step in our analysis is the simulation of the cost of the program based on  the BFL 
model. Table 5 shows that 4,558 out of 7,110  (or 64 percent of)  poor families in treatment 
villages would enroll in the program and accept the condition of school attendance. The average 
cash transfer for these families in treatment villages is estimated at 303 pesos/month, which is 
very close to the average transfer of 300 pesos in January 2002 for 1.6 million families observed 
from official program data. Based on an analytical exercise of scaling up the cost of the program 
                                                           
31  The poverty line is equivalent to 176.17 pesos per month (for details, see Skoufias and Di Maro, 2008) 
32 The ex ante results presented in Table 4 remain the same when the simulations were done without 
incorporating the conditionality of schooling. This suggests that in terms of meeting the poverty reduction 
objective of safety net programs, conditionality does not necessarily imply better results. In other words, 
it suggests that if the main objective of a CCT program is poverty reduction, the transfers are important 
but the conditions are not – which makes perfect intuitive sense. 26 
from the BFL model to the national figure using ENCEL 1997, the total cost of the program is 
estimated to be around 6.08 billion pesos, which is very close to the actual program cost of 6.06 
billion pesos in January 2002 from the official program data (Table 5). 
Table 5: Estimated and Observed PROGRESA's Cost 
 
BFL Simulation
1,2  January 2002
1,3 
Number of Families with Children Receiving Benefits  4,567  1,681,254 
Average Monthly Transfer for Families with Children  $301  $300 
Estimated Total Annual Transfer  $16,517,580  $6,061,221,243 
Scaling Up Total Transfer: Simulated average times 
families in 2002  
$6,080,632,364  n.a. 
Note: 
    1: November 1999 prices 
    2: Estimated by BFL model using Baseline survey of 1997, Rounds 1-4 
3: National official numbers from: 
http://www.oportunidades.gob.mx/indicadores_gestion/ene_feb_02/indice.htm 
Thus  the  BFL  model  applied  to  the  PROGRESA  program  in  Mexico  appears  to  have  strong 
predictive power for the impact of the program on outcome indicators (i.e. enrollment rate, 
child labor and poverty) as well as the cost of the program, when compared against relevant 
benchmarks – namely AIT impacts estimated by ex post evaluations using experimental methods 
and actual or observed program cost. Since ex post AIT estimates represent a lower bound of 
the impact on households that actually received treatment (for reasons explained earlier), the ex 
ante estimates of program impact from BFL should also be seen as a lower bound for the actual 
impacts of the program on beneficiary households.  
The impact of Bono de Desarrollo Humano (BDH) 
As before, we compare the ex ante estimates of program impact from the BFL model with ex 
post findings from Schady and Araújo (2008), henceforth SA. For ex ante simulations, we use the 
baseline survey of BDH collected in Carchi, Imbabura, Cotopaxi and Tungurahaua and described 
in section IV above, which is also used by SA as the baseline data in analyzing impact. It is 
relevant to note that by the authors’ own admission, the results from SA should be treated with 
some caution as they are not based entirely on random assignment.  27 
A summary of descriptive statistics from SA reveals no significant differences between the pre-
defined treated and non-treated samples for a large number of variables (see Appendix, Table 
A-3 – first two columns), suggesting that the random design of the experiment in terms of the 
intended  treatment  and  control  groups  was  successful.
33  However,  the  match  between the 
intended groups with actual BDH recipients is imperfect – transfers went to about 78 and 42 
percent of households in the so-called treatment and control groups, respectively. A comparison 
between recipients and non-recipients of BDH transfer shows significant differences between 
the  two  groups  for  variables  like  child  enrollment,  parental  education  and  household  size 
(Appendix, Table A-3, third and fourth columns). Thus selection into the BDH program appears 
to be non-random.  
In order to avoid misspecification due to bias from the contamination of both treatment and 
control groups, SA computed the “treatment-on-the-treated” or TT estimator using the Two 
Stage Least Square method. The TT estimator suggests that the BDH increased enrollment rates 
among compliers by 9.7 percent, with the statistic being only weakly significant (i.e. significant 
at the 10 percent level but not at 5 percent). Notably, around 25 percent of households in the 
sample believed that compliance with the condition of school attendance was mandatory for 
receiving the cash transfer (to be called “conditioned households” henceforth), despite the fact 
that  this  conditionality  was  not  enforced  by  BDH  administrators.  Out  of  these  conditioned 
households, 55 percent were from treatment and 45 percent from control groups. Following the 
re-weighting scheme of Hirano et al (2003), SA reported the Difference-in-Difference or DD 
estimator,  adding  a  dummy  variable  for  “conditioned”  and  an  interaction  term  of  the 
“conditioned” dummy variable with the treatment group dummy variable.  
As previously mentioned, our BFL model estimator is a type of “Intend-to-treat” estimator, ITT. 
In this case, it is easy to transform the ex post TT estimator from SA (results from Table 3 in SA) 
for comparison with our estimator, as follows: 
    
   
                        
                                                 
                                                           
33 Children from the intended treatment and control groups are indistinguishable in the baseline data in 
terms of their enrollment rate, grade attainment, labor participation, gender, per capita expenditure, 
assets, parental education and household size, 28 
Another issue to take into account is the amount of transfer to be allocated to each child. Our 
BFL model is based on the assumption that the decision to enroll (or not) every child in school is 
made (by the child or the household) independently, taking into account the transfer amount 
for the individual child. But the BDH program transfers US$15 per household, independent of 
the number of  enrolled children in the household, which makes the decision of sending or 
keeping every child in school essentially a household level decision.  
On the one hand, if we set $15 as the direct transfer amount, we suppose that each child will 
add to its utility an amount of $15.αj (for all j= 1, 2),
34 which will lead to an overestimation of the 
effects of the program. This can then be considered as the upper-bound of the estimated impact 
of BDH from the  BFL model. On the  other hand, the  BFL model does allow us to  construct 
alternative scenarios about how the $15 is distributed within the household, namely the size of 
the de facto  transfer to every child when there are multiple children in the household.  We 
propose three alternative scenarios. The first  scenario is one where the transfer received by 
each child is equal to $15 divided by the number of children aged 6 -17 years in the household, 
with a minimum of $3 per child.  In the second scenario, we set an individual transfer of  US$5 
because the average number of potential beneficiaries is close to  three per household. In the 
third scenario, the individual transfer  is set at  $7.5. In order to account for  the cost of the 
program  and  average  size  of  transfer  per  household ,  we  enforce  the  official  household 
maximum of $15  as defined by the BDH program  and also compute  its impact  without any 
household maximum.  
Table 6 shows all ex post estimators obtained by SA and the results of the different scenarios 
proposed using the BFL model. As expected, the ex ante or simulated ITT estimator under the 
assumption of US$15 transfer per child (IIT
1), at 14.58 percent, is almost double the size of the 
ex post impact measured by SA at 10 percent. The annual cost of the program under scenario 1 
(US$15 per household, despite individual decision) is US$166,000 if we set the household ceiling 
at US$15. Allowing for different amounts of transfer per household would increase the average 
transfer to US$32.33 and the total annual cost would more than double. However, the effect on 
enrolment rate generated by scenario 1 is unlikely, as a child living with its siblings will never 
make a decision on program participation based on a US$15 transfer.  
                                                           
34 Refer to Equation (4) earlier. 29 
The next three proposed scenarios have lower estimated impacts ranging from 5.86 percent to 9 
percent; and for all three cases, the ex post ITT estimator falls in the 95 percent confidence 
interval of the ex ante ITT estimator. For these scenarios, the average transfer per household 
ranges  from  US$9.8  to  US$15.95,  regardless  of  whether  the  US$15  ceiling  is  taken  into 
consideration. As a consequence, the estimated cost of the program never extrapolates to the 
cost in scenario 1 of US$15 per household. For example, this result suggests that we would have 
observed higher program effects (without affecting the overall cost of the program) by making 
individual, smaller transfers of US$7.5 per child, so that the amount of transfer per household 
ranges from US$7.5 to US$45 depending on the size of the household.  
For the reasons described earlier, we cannot calculate ex post results for the BDH program in a 
way that would allow for a direct comparison with ex ante predictions as we have done for the 
case  of  PROGRESA.  However,  the  prediction  power  of  the  BFL  model  is  reasonable  and 
consistent with our expectations conditional on the assumption made about the allocation of 
the household transfer among beneficiaries. As we would expect, considering each child in the 
sample to be a household under the BFL definition (and receiving US$15) overestimates the 
impact of the BDH. Keeping the average transfer per household close to aor above US$15 and 
using  smaller  amounts  of  transfer  per  child,  the  BFL  model  estimates  program  effects  on 
enrollment rate that are not statistically different (at 5 percent level of significance) from ex post 
results reported by SA for all simulated ITT estimators. 
VI. Conclusion 
The results of our paper suggest that ex ante and ex post methods for estimating impacts can 
effectively complement each other to inform the design and evaluation of social programs. In 
principle, combining an ex ante simulation exercise using a structural model of schooling choices 
with an experimental evaluation design would help policymakers to assess the implications of 
alternative choices for program design, potential impacts and cost implications upfront, and rely 
on ex post evaluation results to validate and identify the actual impacts of the program. For ex 
ante models to be used this way, however, their results need to be credible in terms of accuracy 
or predictive power. Our findings make some progress in this direction. Our results suggest that 
ex ante predictions of certain impacts of CCT programs using the BFL model match up well with 30 
ex post “gold standard” results from experiments, which should lend confidence to policymakers 
about the reliability of ex ante estimates from this model.  
The  primary  analysis  of  the  paper  consists  of  comparing  the  ex  ante  simulated  impact  on 
enrolment rates using the BFL model with the ex post impact estimates from a randomized 
experiment. For the case of the PROGRESA program in Mexico, we can also compare the ex ante 
and ex post estimates of program impact on poverty. Such a comparison of methods is also a 
test to validate the hypothesis central to such ex ante models: cross-sectional income effects, 
estimated  on  the  basis  of  the  representative  household  sample,  coincide  with  the  income 
effects generated by a program.  
For  PROGRESA,  we  estimate  that  the  predicted  impact  tends  to  understate  but  is  not 
significantly different (at 5 percent level of statistical significance) from ex post “intent to treat” 
or  ITT  estimators  of  impact  for  all  age  groups  of  boys  and  girls.  Moreover, the  BFL  model 
estimates similar results in terms of changes in poverty levels. For the Ecuadorian program Bono 
de Desarrollo Humano (BDH), the use of the BFL model, with reasonable assumptions about how 
the  household  level  transfers  would  translate  to  de  facto  transfers  for  every  child,  yields 
simulated impacts that are again statistically similar to ex post ITT impact estimates. The fact 
that  ex  ante  predictions  from  the  BFL  model  are  validated  by  ex  post estimates  also  lends 
confidence to the use of the model for analyzing other types of questions related to program 
design. These are questions that are important for the program designer before designing the 
program, but too expensive or cumbersome to implement as a pilot to evaluate the actual 
impacts ex post. An example of such questions is: What would have been the likely impact of 
PROGRESA on enrollments if it were an unconditional cash transfer? Using the BFL model we 
find that transfers without conditions would not have produced the enrollment impacts seen 
from the conditional transfer. In case of BDH, the ex ante simulations suggest that program 
impact on enrollment rates could have been higher if the transfers were smaller and for each 
individual child (instead of a flat amount every household), for an unchanged overall cost of the 
program.  
Thus the ex ante method proposed by Bourguignon, Ferreira and Leite (2003) can be a powerful 
simulation method in designing or reforming CCT programs that aim to improve enrollments. 
The built-in advantages of an ex ante approach – in terms of cost, practicality and the stage of 31 
the program cycle when it can be done – implies that a model that performs well against the 
benchmark  of  “gold-standard”  ex  post  evaluations  can  be  extremely  helpful  to  inform 
policymakers about program design. One major advantage is that in many cases, such a model 
can allow for comparison between the likely impacts of alternative ways of designing a program 
– without the time, cost and logistics involved in setting up multiple pilot experiments to obtain 
ex post evaluation results. There are important caveats as well to the use of the  BFL model, the 
most important among which is that ex ante analysis cannot incorporate any unanticipated 
changes  that  may  occur  during  the  process  of  program  implementation,  be  that  in  the 
implementation process or in any other extraneous events (including large shocks) that can 
affect  the  behavior  of  program  participants.  The  ex  ante  exercise  would  then  need  to  be 
followed up with an ex post impact evaluation that is able to capture the actual effect of the 
program  on  the  outcomes  of  interest,  taking  into  account  all  the  possible  changes  in  the 
program  and  the  environment  it  operates  in  that  could  have  occurred  as  it  was  being 
implemented.  32 
Table 6: Children’s Occupational Choices in Ecuador 2003-2005 
Actual and Counterfactual Enrollment Rate for Target Population 

















1  Simulated ITT
2  Simulated ITT
3  Simulated ITT
4 
Table 4 - Results                 
2SLS  10.00%  10.00%  77%  7.7%  14.58%  7.63%  5.86%  9.00% 
  4.72%  4.72%      0.53%  0.82%  1.10%  0.60% 
Average Transfer per Household with Ceiling of $15 per household  15.00  11.91  9.80  12.31 
Number of households  645  631  596  603 
Annual Cost  116,100.00  90,192.00  70,080.00  89,100.00 
Average Transfer per Household without Household Ceiling  32.33  11.92  10.35  15.95 
Number of households  645  631  599  605 
Annual Cost  250,200.00  90,264.00  74,400.00  115,830.00 
Source: Schady and Araújo (2008) table 4 column (3). 
Note: 
1 - R$15 per child assuming unitary child household. 
2 - $15 divided by number of children age 6-17 in the household. Minimum transfer $3 per child. 
3 - $5 per child. 
4 - $7.5 per child. 
** Significant at 5% level; 
* Significant at 10% level. 
Standard Deviation computed by bootstrap method. 
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Table A-1: PROGRESA Monthly Cash Transfer 
(Pesos - July to December 1999) 
Educational grant per child  Boys  Girls 
Primary    
  3rd  80  80 
4th  95  95 
5th  125  125 
6th  165  165 
Secondary    
  1st  240  250 
2nd  250  280 
3rd  265  305 
Cash grant for food per household  125 
Maximum transfer per household  750 
Source: Skoufias and Parker (2001). 37 
 
Table A-2: Descriptive Statistics from PROGRESA Baseline Survey 












Age  14.8  12.6  11.2  12.3 
Years of Schooling  5.5  5.3  4.6  4.9 
Household Per Capita Income  301.7  238.5  241.3  259.3 
Observed Children's earnings 
      8  536.5  282.1  0.0  381.0 
9  484.2  217.3  0.0  301.6 
10  593.2  317.1  0.0  424.8 
11  680.4  389.4  0.0  537.9 
12  706.1  323.1  0.0  518.8 
13  618.3  332.9  0.0  541.9 
14  702.8  415.1  0.0  653.4 
15  793.8  453.2  0.0  760.8 
16  813.5  549.5  0.0  792.6 
17  838.7  690.5  0.0  830.4 
Years of schooling of more educated 
parent 
2.7  3.3  3.7  3.4 
Age of Older Parent (years)  47.5  45.3  45.2  45.9 
Number of Household members  7.3  7.3  7.2  7.2 
Male (%)  48.2  72.8  51.5  51.4 
Father works in agriculture sector (%) 
46.6  34.7  51.3  49.2 
Proportion of universe (%)  30.0  4.3  65.7  100 
Population  10,081  1,435  22,093  33,609 
8 (%)  4.9  2.5  92.6  100 
9 (%)  4.2  3.5  92.3  100 
10 (%)  5.6  3.5  90.9  100 
11 (%)  7.0  4.5  88.6  100 
12 (%)  16.6  6.1  77.3  100 
13 (%)  28.1  5.8  66.1  100 
14 (%)  42.0  5.4  52.6  100 
15 (%)  57.7  4.1  38.2  100 
16 (%)  71.3  4.3  24.5  100 
17 (%)  81.6  3.1  15.2  100 
Source: Baseline Survey 1997; and Authors' calculation. 38 
 
Table A-3: Differences between Treatment and Control Groups – BDH Baseline Survey 
  Differences between 
Treatment and Control Groups 
Differences between recipients and 
non-recipients of the BDH transfers 
  Mean: 
Control 
Difference  Mean: non-
recipients 
Difference 






















































































F-statistic (p-value)    0.15    0.002 
Note: All means refer to baseline values.  Standard errors in estimated difference for child-specific 
variables adjust for within-sibling correlation.  **Significant difference at the 5 percent level; *** at the 
1 percent level.  The sample is limited to households who had school-aged children in both the baseline 
and follow-up surveys.  Sample size is 2876 for all child-specific variables, and 1309 for all household-
specific variables except father’s education (n=1227) and mother’s education (n=1279).   
Source: Schady and Araújo (2006) – Table 2. 39 
 
Regression results 
Estimations for Mexico (PROGRESA) 
 
Table A-4: OLS Regression using ENCEL 1997 
Number of Obs = 3549; Adj R-squared = 0.2718; Root MSE = 0.65883 
  l_earn    Coef.  Std.  t  P>|t| 
  ws    -0.6354  0.037176  -17.09  0 
  _Iage_9    0.157519  0.219373  0.72  0.473 
  _Iage_10    0.460302  0.189121  2.43  0.015 
  _Iage_11    0.779767  0.184945  4.22  0 
  _Iage_12    0.758285  0.168635  4.5  0 
  _Iage_13    0.778888  0.164875  4.72  0 
  _Iage_14    0.910126  0.163087  5.58  0 
  _Iage_15    0.964133  0.162588  5.93  0 
  _Iage_16    1.016574  0.162404  6.26  0 
  _Iage_17    1.029843  0.162258  6.35  0 
  _Isex_1    0.229161  0.058058  3.95  0 
  school    0.022947  0.007705  2.98  0.003 
  _IsexXscho~1    -0.02151  0.008536  -2.52  0.012 
  lsalm    0.234924  0.033639  6.98  0 
  iml7954r    -0.04904  0.023816  -2.06  0.04 
  pobreden    -0.09103  0.03038  -3  0.003 
  _Istate_13    -0.1022  0.078887  -1.3  0.195 
  _Istate_16    -0.00615  0.096089  -0.06  0.949 
  _Istate_21    -0.08348  0.083244  -1  0.316 
  _Istate_22    -0.06409  0.097702  -0.66  0.512 
  _Istate_24    -0.12837  0.088878  -1.44  0.149 
  _Istate_30    -0.10423  0.086443  -1.21  0.228 
  MUNICIPIO DUMMIES       
  _cons    2.435359  0.250553  9.72  0 
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Table A-5: MLOGIT Regression using ENCEL1997 
Number of obs = 33383; LR chi2(284) = 18780.43; Prob > chi2 = 0; Log likelihood = -16133;  
Pseudo R2 = 0.3679 
  sit    Coef.  Std.  z  P>|z| 
1             
  rendomo    -0.00034  0.000169  -2.02  0.043 
  what    -0.01211  0.004561  -2.66  0.008 
  sex    1.105229  0.146383  7.55  0 
  _Iage_9    0.370892  0.190677  1.95  0.052 
  _Iage_10    0.164794  0.191683  0.86  0.39 
  _Iage_11    0.21229  0.22004  0.96  0.335 
  _Iage_12    -0.5613  0.210174  -2.67  0.008 
  _Iage_13    -1.34199  0.218375  -6.15  0 
  _Iage_14    -1.94908  0.247149  -7.89  0 
  _Iage_15    -2.6782  0.267839  -10  0 
  _Iage_16    -2.95637  0.285206  -10.37  0 
  _Iage_17    -3.47639  0.296784  -11.71  0 
  _IsexXscho~1    0.035069  0.023569  1.49  0.137 
  _Istate_13    -1.5521  0.220932  -7.03  0 
  _Istate_16    -1.43423  0.223446  -6.42  0 
  _Istate_21    -0.99432  0.21386  -4.65  0 
  _Istate_22    -1.94792  0.261181  -7.46  0 
  _Istate_24    -2.11771  0.229534  -9.23  0 
  _Istate_30    -0.96735  0.227391  -4.25  0 
  MUNICIPIO DUMMY         
  school    0.223272  0.0235  9.5  0 
  ranki    -0.01069  0.037808  -0.28  0.777 
  ncri    0.080001  0.021681  3.69  0 
  ed_che    0.041625  0.012431  3.35  0.001 
  id_che    -0.00107  0.003113  -0.34  0.73 
  pereagr    -0.5809  0.070275  -8.27  0 
  ESC_p    0.820492  0.243902  3.36  0.001 
  ESC_s    1.533228  0.37282  4.11  0 
  distSEC    -0.04933  0.019245  -2.56  0.01 
  _cons    0.061112  0.477692  0.13  0.898 
2             
  rendomo    -2.6E-05  5.78E-05  -0.46  0.649 
  what    -0.00881  0.002527  -3.49  0 
  sex    0.418524  0.076557  5.47  0 
  _Iage_9    -0.05109  0.118538  -0.43  0.666 
  _Iage_10    -0.51105  0.113398  -4.51  0 
  _Iage_11    -0.84711  0.127128  -6.66  0 
  _Iage_12    -2.13563  0.117257  -18.21  0 
  _Iage_13    -3.17132  0.11892  -26.67  0 
  _Iage_14    -4.05299  0.13363  -30.33  0 
  _Iage_15    -5.00498  0.143825  -34.8  0 
  _Iage_16    -5.80871  0.156125  -37.21  0 
  _Iage_17    -6.54823  0.163246  -40.11  0 41 
 
  _IsexXscho~1    -0.01839  0.011115  -1.65  0.098 
  _Istate_13    0.008042  0.108736  0.07  0.941 
  _Istate_16    -0.54651  0.121999  -4.48  0 
  _Istate_21    -0.69317  0.115782  -5.99  0 
  _Istate_22    -0.41603  0.119283  -3.49  0 
  _Istate_24    -0.39484  0.117655  -3.36  0.001 
  _Istate_30    -0.24031  0.12064  -1.99  0.046 
  MUNICIPIO DUMMY         
  school    0.341356  0.010447  32.67  0 
  ranki    0.094725  0.021523  4.4  0 
  ncri    -0.03456  0.011984  -2.88  0.004 
  ed_che    0.064438  0.00701  9.19  0 
  id_che    0.004859  0.001671  2.91  0.004 
  pereagr    0.012498  0.036473  0.34  0.732 
  ESC_p    0.105365  0.130649  0.81  0.42 
  ESC_s    1.33154  0.263694  5.05  0 
  distSEC    -0.10569  0.010067  -10.5  0 
  _cons    2.479397  0.255503  9.7  0 




Table A-6: OLS Regression using ENCEL 1997 12-17 years old 
Number of obs = 3422; Adj R-squared = 0.2312; Root MSE = 0.63528 
  l_earn    Coef.  Std.  t  P>|t| 
   
  ws    -0.6075  0.037497  -16.2  0 
  _Iage_13    0.036609  0.069916  0.52  0.601 
  _Iage_14    0.173965  0.064705  2.69  0.007 
  _Iage_15    0.229693  0.062767  3.66  0 
  _Iage_16    0.2821  0.062238  4.53  0 
  _Iage_17    0.294646  0.06213  4.74  0 
  _Isex_1    0.204211  0.058664  3.48  0.001 
  school    0.019267  0.007614  2.53  0.011 
  _IsexXscho~1    -0.01878  0.0085  -2.21  0.027 
  lsalm    0.232743  0.032937  7.07  0 
  iml7954r    -0.04817  0.023427  -2.06  0.04 
  pobreden    -0.0924  0.02966  -3.12  0.002 
  _Istate_13    -0.10255  0.077337  -1.33  0.185 
  _Istate_16    0.014942  0.094584  0.16  0.874 
  _Istate_21    -0.07067  0.08192  -0.86  0.388 
  _Istate_22    -0.06368  0.096157  -0.66  0.508 
  _Istate_24    -0.12769  0.087166  -1.46  0.143 
  _Istate_30    -0.13361  0.084659  -1.58  0.115 
  MUNICIPIO DUMMY         
  _cons    3.176226  0.201298  15.78  0 42 
 
Table A-7: MLOGIT Regression using ENCEL 1997 12-17 years old 
Number of obs = 19282; LR chi2(276) = 8979.81; Prob > chi2 = 0; Log likelihood = -11890.6;  
Pseudo R2 = 0.2741 
  sit    Coef.  Std.  z  P>|z| 
1             
  rendomo    -0.00036  0.000204  -1.75  0.08 
  what    -0.00974  0.005737  -1.7  0.089 
  sex    1.336258  0.216444  6.17  0 
  _Iage_13    -0.76115  0.121148  -6.28  0 
  _Iage_14    -1.37954  0.139038  -9.92  0 
  _Iage_15    -2.1014  0.160786  -13.07  0 
  _Iage_16    -2.3889  0.180381  -13.24  0 
  _Iage_17    -2.90052  0.196287  -14.78  0 
  _IsexXscho~1    0.004386  0.030551  0.14  0.886 
  _Istate_13    -1.59308  0.263266  -6.05  0 
  _Istate_16    -1.8076  0.273142  -6.62  0 
  _Istate_21    -1.11296  0.255425  -4.36  0 
  _Istate_22    -2.08594  0.313184  -6.66  0 
  _Istate_24    -2.32464  0.27933  -8.32  0 
  _Istate_30    -1.05794  0.269358  -3.93  0 
  MUNICIPIO DUMMY         
  school    0.209312  0.02827  7.4  0 
  ranki    -0.00671  0.057266  -0.12  0.907 
  ncri    0.033444  0.025891  1.29  0.196 
  ed_che    0.018113  0.015336  1.18  0.238 
  id_che    0.000436  0.003751  0.12  0.907 
  pereagr    -0.40546  0.082632  -4.91  0 
  ESC_p    0.583097  0.287884  2.03  0.043 
  ESC_s    1.591755  0.381581  4.17  0 
  distSEC    -0.05203  0.023577  -2.21  0.027 
  _cons    -0.16313  0.640248  -0.25  0.799 
2             
  rendomo    -7.4E-05  6.17E-05  -1.2  0.229 
  what    -0.00509  0.002922  -1.74  0.082 
  sex    0.667565  0.100408  6.65  0 
  _Iage_13    -1.00445  0.065313  -15.38  0 
  _Iage_14    -1.89471  0.072623  -26.09  0 
  _Iage_15    -2.82463  0.081792  -34.53  0 
  _Iage_16    -3.62027  0.095427  -37.94  0 
  _Iage_17    -4.35211  0.104709  -41.56  0 
  _IsexXscho~1    -0.04866  0.013445  -3.62  0 
  _Istate_13    -0.39296  0.123475  -3.18  0.001 
  _Istate_16    -1.09535  0.139274  -7.86  0 
  _Istate_21    -1.05066  0.132351  -7.94  0 
  _Istate_22    -0.90335  0.136086  -6.64  0 
  _Istate_24    -0.89142  0.132328  -6.74  0 
  _Istate_30    -0.51679  0.136568  -3.78  0 
  MUNICIPIO DUMMY         43 
 
  school    0.323843  0.011453  28.28  0 
  ranki    0.095179  0.028809  3.3  0.001 
  ncri    -0.04391  0.013294  -3.3  0.001 
  ed_che    0.058434  0.007735  7.55  0 
  id_che    0.006369  0.001868  3.41  0.001 
  pereagr    -0.00557  0.040552  -0.14  0.891 
  ESC_p    0.075362  0.144107  0.52  0.601 
  ESC_s    1.224399  0.272513  4.49  0 
  distSEC    -0.12436  0.011692  -10.64  0 
  _cons    0.603831  0.313559  1.93  0.054 




Table A-8: OLS Regression using ENIGH 1999 12-17 years old 
Number of obs = 1229; R-squared = 0.3535; Root MSE = 0.70413 
    Robust         
  l_earn    Coef.  Std.  t  P>|t| 
     
  ws    -0.49817  0.080114  -6.22  0 
  _Ischool_1    -0.83503  0.251169  -3.32  0.001 
  _Ischool_2    -0.0031  0.138087  -0.02  0.982 
  _Ischool_3    -0.81435  0.107551  -7.57  0 
  _Ischool_4    -0.80037  0.209365  -3.82  0 
  _Ischool_5    -0.4339  0.553829  -0.78  0.434 
  _Ischool_6    -1.13081  0.307738  -3.67  0 
  _Ischool_7    1.419835  0.154841  9.17  0 
  _Ischool_8    -0.24301  0.263424  -0.92  0.356 
  _Ischool_9    -0.57605  0.367697  -1.57  0.117 
  _Iage_13    -0.71879  0.134218  -5.36  0 
  _Iage_14    0.082265  0.207099  0.4  0.691 
  _Iage_15    -0.46776  0.083621  -5.59  0 
  _Iage_16    -0.46811  0.315204  -1.49  0.138 
  _Iage_17    0.041793  0.172272  0.24  0.808 
  SCHOOL x AGE interaction       
  sex    0.026597  0.057631  0.46  0.645 
  lsalm    0.677629  0.078768  8.6  0 
  urbano    0.172929  0.064045  2.7  0.007 
  _cons    1.326435  0.304249  4.36  0 
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Table A-9: MLOGIT Regression using ENIGH 1999 12-17 years old 
Number of obs = 9183; Wald chi2(64) = 1401.81; Prob > chi2 = 0;  
Log pseudo-likelihood =-5138.31; Pseudo R2 = 0.34 
    Robust         
  sit    Coef.  Std.  z  P>|z| 
1             
  rendomo    -0.00024  0.000273  -0.88  0.377 
  what    -0.00708  0.00279  -2.54  0.011 
  hhsize    -0.00035  0.036806  -0.01  0.992 
  _Ischool_1    21.25102  9.787838  2.17  0.03 
  _Ischool_2    13.79116  3.118599  4.42  0 
  _Ischool_3    20.71353  4.514764  4.59  0 
  _Ischool_4    15.23906  2.693013  5.66  0 
  _Ischool_5    17.30204  2.785797  6.21  0 
  _Ischool_6    6.892596  2.004884  3.44  0.001 
  _Ischool_7    16.8561  2.878271  5.86  0 
  _Ischool_8    23.75594  3.598322  6.6  0 
  _Ischool_9    5.006638  3.116995  1.61  0.108 
  age    -2.38333  1.126347  -2.12  0.034 
  _IschXage_1    -1.27471  0.762994  -1.67  0.095 
  _IschXage_2    -0.73041  0.216395  -3.38  0.001 
  _IschXage_3    -1.23374  0.334568  -3.69  0 
  _IschXage_4    -0.74307  0.180915  -4.11  0 
  _IschXage_5    -0.84201  0.179096  -4.7  0 
  _IschXage_6    -0.23137  0.123083  -1.88  0.06 
  _IschXage_7    -0.70804  0.184502  -3.84  0 
  _IschXage_8    -1.1285  0.224  -5.04  0 
  _IschXage_9    0.015271  0.183439  0.08  0.934 
  age2    0.073948  0.039074  1.89  0.058 
  sex    0.924371  0.137466  6.72  0 
  ncri    -0.06586  0.06578  -1  0.317 
  ed_che    0.089529  0.027089  3.3  0.001 
  id_che    0.010682  0.007018  1.52  0.128 
  _Ichef_ana~1    0.27459  0.234554  1.17  0.242 
  _Iurbano_1    -0.18893  0.187438  -1.01  0.313 
  _IcheXurb_~1    0.086548  0.340221  0.25  0.799 
  _Ipereagr_1    -0.89107  0.255841  -3.48  0 
  _IperXurb_~1    -0.05922  0.46076  -0.13  0.898 
  _cons    12.0094  8.08279  1.49  0.137 
2             
  rendomo    0.000757  0.000151  5.03  0 
  what    -0.00365  0.001875  -1.95  0.052 
  hhsize    -0.03056  0.029843  -1.02  0.306 
  _Ischool_1    20.01243  6.287175  3.18  0.001 
  _Ischool_2    14.05995  4.56299  3.08  0.002 
  _Ischool_3    20.30527  4.525572  4.49  0 
  _Ischool_4    18.9947  4.291385  4.43  0 
  _Ischool_5    19.82598  4.33549  4.57  0 45 
 
  _Ischool_6    12.39132  3.53123  3.51  0 
  _Ischool_7    20.08583  3.948379  5.09  0 
  _Ischool_8    24.65777  4.47102  5.52  0 
  _Ischool_9    8.250779  3.943195  2.09  0.036 
  age    -1.23758  0.864201  -1.43  0.152 
  _IschXage_1    -1.29412  0.47178  -2.74  0.006 
  _IschXage_2    -0.79471  0.326542  -2.43  0.015 
  _IschXage_3    -1.27234  0.325518  -3.91  0 
  _IschXage_4    -1.14464  0.30586  -3.74  0 
  _IschXage_5    -1.11763  0.302626  -3.69  0 
  _IschXage_6    -0.69827  0.247192  -2.82  0.005 
  _IschXage_7    -1.03201  0.273385  -3.77  0 
  _IschXage_8    -1.2717  0.300841  -4.23  0 
  _IschXage_9    -0.27782  0.267857  -1.04  0.3 
  age2    0.033179  0.02873  1.15  0.248 
  sex    0.254487  0.087417  2.91  0.004 
  ncri    -0.10554  0.0526  -2.01  0.045 
  ed_che    0.144227  0.016025  9  0 
  id_che    0.021386  0.004875  4.39  0 
  _Ichef_ana~1    0.465103  0.178107  2.61  0.009 
  _Iurbano_1    0.771415  0.121484  6.35  0 
  _IcheXurb_~1    -0.62397  0.246272  -2.53  0.011 
  _Ipereagr_1    -0.14676  0.171696  -0.85  0.393 
  _IperXurb_~1    -0.15915  0.284332  -0.56  0.576 




Estimations for Ecuador (BDH) 
Table A-10: OLS Regression using Baseline 2003 
Number of obs = 267; R-squared = 0.4264; Root MSE = 0.67868 
    Robust         
  l_earn    Coef.  Std.  t  P>|t| 
     
  ws    -0.49977  0.201318  -2.48  0.014 
  age    -0.24467  0.356101  -0.69  0.493 
  age2    0.012886  0.012762  1.01  0.314 
  sex    0.180629  0.091735  1.97  0.05 
  lsalm    0.396124  0.174559  2.27  0.024 
  urban    0.126072  0.135503  0.93  0.353 
  _Ischool_1    -2.19578  0.530415  -4.14  0 
  _Ischool_2    -1.00641  0.568661  -1.77  0.078 
  _Ischool_3    -0.77323  0.407913  -1.9  0.059 
  _Ischool_4    -1.66233  0.449178  -3.7  0 
  _Ischool_5    -0.89796  0.448714  -2  0.047 
  _Ischool_6    -0.50477  0.324735  -1.55  0.121 
  _Ischool_7    0.040771  0.403345  0.1  0.92 
  _Ischool_8    -0.68354  0.444674  -1.54  0.126 
  _Ischool_9    -0.44851  0.483612  -0.93  0.355 
 
CANTON 
DUMMY           
  _cons    2.784753  2.51582  1.11  0.269 
     
 
 
Table A-11: MLOGIT Regression using Baseline 2003 
Number of obs = 2876; Wald chi2(94) = 1285.13; Prob > chi2 = 0; Log pseudo-likelihood = -1619.63 
Pseudo R2 = 0.4679; Std. Err. Adjusted for 1306 clusters 
    Robust         
  sit    Coef.  Std.  z  P>|z| 
1             
  rendomo    0.002349  0.001251  1.88  0.06 
  what    -0.05672  0.015445  -3.67  0 
  hhsize    -0.20205  0.06061  -3.33  0.001 
  age2    -0.02822  0.003554  -7.94  0 
  mae    0.101713  0.291116  0.35  0.727 
  domes    1.120512  0.201157  5.57  0 
  sex    0.819148  0.147756  5.54  0 
  school    -0.06533  0.370655  -0.18  0.86 
  school2    0.087116  0.022173  3.93  0 
  ed_che    0.11097  0.034543  3.21  0.001 
  analf_che    -0.06359  0.230309  -0.28  0.782 
  id_che    0.005117  0.009819  0.52  0.602 
  indig_che    -0.04508  0.24461  -0.18  0.854 47 
 
  n05    0.077647  0.135983  0.57  0.568 
  nenrol    0.003889  0.100783  0.04  0.969 
  necoact    0.718026  0.124442  5.77  0 
  ranki    -0.41967  0.155434  -2.7  0.007 
  water    0.010287  0.187873  0.05  0.956 
  toilet    -0.59454  0.248398  -2.39  0.017 
  wealth1    0.074518  0.112082  0.66  0.506 
  urban    0.269404  0.226346  1.19  0.234 
  CANTON DUMMY         
  _Igage_1    2.243918  2.029061  1.11  0.269 
  _Igage_2    1.332428  1.583292  0.84  0.4 
  _IgagXscho~1    0.035771  0.391392  0.09  0.927 
  _IgagXscho~2    -0.22326  0.214244  -1.04  0.297 
  _cons    -0.21259  2.179989  -0.1  0.922 
2             
  rendomo    0.00277  0.001241  2.23  0.026 
  what    -0.05448  0.015159  -3.59  0 
  hhsize    -0.06539  0.058908  -1.11  0.267 
  age2    -0.02977  0.003425  -8.69  0 
  mae    0.091806  0.294041  0.31  0.755 
  domes    0.576011  0.195201  2.95  0.003 
  sex    0.200328  0.151231  1.32  0.185 
  school    0.269437  0.440786  0.61  0.541 
  school2    0.070922  0.025259  2.81  0.005 
  ed_che    0.142764  0.035089  4.07  0 
  analf_che    -0.42179  0.22192  -1.9  0.057 
  id_che    -4.5E-05  0.009591  0  0.996 
  indig_che    -0.48946  0.269788  -1.81  0.07 
  n05    -0.05303  0.130141  -0.41  0.684 
  nenrol    0.294744  0.104771  2.81  0.005 
  necoact    -1.71552  0.179068  -9.58  0 
  ranki    1.03071  0.192825  5.35  0 
  water    0.340674  0.167277  2.04  0.042 
  toilet    0.006488  0.20741  0.03  0.975 
  wealth1    0.070699  0.105214  0.67  0.502 
  urban    0.088551  0.205876  0.43  0.667 
  CANTON DUMMY         
  _Igage_1    4.479492  2.512193  1.78  0.075 
  _Igage_2    2.424846  2.01771  1.2  0.229 
  _IgagXscho~1    -0.46749  0.464386  -1.01  0.314 
  _IgagXscho~2    -0.32443  0.263182  -1.23  0.218 
  _cons    -0.76923  2.578151  -0.3  0.765 
     




Estimations for Nicaragua (RPS) 
Table A-12: Ex Ante simulations using the BFL for the Red de Protection Solidaria (RPS) 
program in Nicaragua: Statistics from RPS Baseline and follow-up Survey 
Actual and Counterfactual for Target Population 
   
   Ex Post* AIT      Ex Ante AIT     
Enrollment Rate    
 
    
 
  
Children 7-to-13 years old
1  22.1%  4.0%  ***  21.7%  2.2%  *** 
     




Child Labor    
 
    
 
  
Children 7-to-13 years old
2  -2.5%  2.7%     -2.1%  0.9%  ** 
Source: RPS Baseline survey 2000 and Follow-up survey 2001. 
          Notes: 
* Results from Maluccio and Flores (2004);  
1 Table 10 - Maluccio and Flores (2004),
 2 Table 13 - Maluccio and 
Flores (2004) 
   
 
Table A-13: The Red de Protección Social program 
  The RPS program Started in 2000 and it was expanded in 2002 
  The RPS targeted poor households in rural areas using PMT to identify beneficiaries 
  The RPS program is a conditional cash transfer (CCT) 
  The RPS beneficiaries must keep children aged 7-13 years-old in school and participate in educational 
workshops. 
  The  RPS beneficiaries  must  attend health center if pregnant or if have children  0-5 years old in the 
household; 
  The RPS transfer was fixed per household regardless number or children plus individual school supply 
transfer 